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I. INTRODUCTION
When a corporation has a legal problem, its board of directors will
normally decide to take a course of action that it feels is in the corpo-
ration's best interest. Sometimes this means litigation, while other
times it means simply ignoring the problem. In some situations, how-
ever, the course of action that the board of directors decides to pursue
may not be in the corporation's best interests. This often arises when
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Mathew Anderson, J.D. expected, May 2002, University of Nebraska College of
Law (NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW member, 2000).
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directors breach a fiduciary duty to the corporation.1 When this oc-
curs, the corporation will have a claim against the directors. The
problem with this situation is that the same directors who breached
their duty simultaneously control the corporation, so it is unlikely that
they will decide to bring an action against themselves. For these spe-
cial situations the law has created a mechanism that allows a share-
holder to instigate an action on behalf of the corporation. Essentially,
"[a] shareholder-controlled derivative suit is a usurpation of the direc-
tors' normal power to manage the business and affairs of a corporation
justifiable only in circumstances where the directors are unable or un-
willing to handle the litigation in the best interests of the
corporation."2
To understand the significance of an appeal of a derivative suit, it
is first necessary to understand the derivative suit itself. The struc-
ture of the derivative suit is rather unusual. "In its classic form, a
derivative suit involves two actions brought by an individual share-
holder: (i) an action against the corporation for failing to bring a speci-
fied suit and (ii) an action on behalf of the corporation for harm to it
identical to the one which the corporation failed to bring."3 Since the
shareholder takes action on behalf of the corporation, any recovery
will go to the corporation rather than the specific shareholder bringing
the action. As Judge Winter more elegantly put it in Joy v. North4 :
[T]he shareholder plaintiffs are quite often little more than a formality for
purposes of the caption rather than parties with a real interest in the out-
come. Since any judgment runs to the corporation, shareholder plaintiffs at
best realize an appreciation in the value of their shares. The real incentive to
bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of return to the corporation
but the hope of handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel.
5
The court went on to state:
Since very few shareholders would pay an attorney's fee out of their own
pocket to finance a suit that is brought on the corporation's behalf and nor-
mally holds only a slight and indirect benefit for the plaintiff, very few deriva-
tive actions would be brought if the law did not allow the plaintiffs attorney to
be compensated by a contingent fee payable out of the corporate recovery.
6
Thus, the role of the plaintiffs attorney is very important in derivative
actions.
While derivative actions would rarely be brought without plain-
tiffs' attorneys, the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys bring the actions also
causes a major problem. As many courts and commentators have
pointed out, "[olne of the risks flowing from shareholders' difficulty in
1. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusiNEss AssocIATIoNs: CASES AND MATERLLS 395 (3d ed. 1999).
2. Id. at 397.
3. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 887.
5. Id.
6. Id. (quoting CARY & EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 938 (5th ed. 1980)).
FELZEN V. ANDREAS
monitoring derivative litigation is that plaintiffs' counsel and the de-
fendants will structure a settlement such that the plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees are disproportionate to any relief obtained for the corporation."7
Derivative litigation brings with it a risk that a plaintiffs attorney
will settle on an agreement that provides little benefit to the corpora-
tion but provides high fees for herself.8
The law has, however, created a mechanism that helps to ensure
that the settlement agreements are fair and reasonable. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1 requires the court to approve the settlement
and to give notice of the proposed compromise or dismissal to the
shareholders. 9 This notice not only informs the shareholders of the
pending litigation and terms of the settlement,10 but also provides the
shareholders with a chance to object to the settlement at the settle-
ment hearing."i Once notice is given, shareholders that disapprove of
the settlement have the option to voice their objections to the court.
After hearing the shareholders' objections, the court will then deter-
mine whether to approve the settlement.' 2
7. Bell At. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Felzen v.
Andreas, 134 F.3d 873,876 (7th Cir. 1998); Jeffrey Michael Smith, Note, The Role
of the Attorney in Protecting (and Impairing) Shareholder Interests: Incentives
and Disincentives to Maximize Corporate Wealth, 47 DuiK L.J. 161, 176-77 (1997)
('The decisions made by the entrepreneur-attorney, both before and after the suit
has been filed, reflect the attorney's own interests and not those of the client.").
8. See Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 1999); Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1310;
5 JAtEs WMi. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.1.10121 [a] (3d ed.) ("Deriv-
ative actions pose the inherent risk that the representative plaintiff will collude
with the defendant to forego the derivative claims in exchange for a settlement
that is only favorable to the representative plaintiff and his or her attorneys.").
9. See FED. R. Cir. P. 23.1.
10. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309 n.9 (stating that most shareholders are not
even aware of the litigation until they receive the notice of the settlement or
dismissal).
11. Although not specifically mandated by Rule 23.1, it is common practice among
the courts to invite the shareholders to the settlement hearing so that they may
present any objections they have to the proposed settlement. See, e.g., Bell Atl.
Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307. While analyzing the notice requirement of Rule 23(c),
which was the predecessor to Rule 23.1, the court in Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d
721 (6th Cir. 1942), stated:
The rule provides for notice to stockholders not only in order that they
may have the right to be heard but also in order that the court may have
the benefit of that broader information which comes from receiving ad-
vice as to the views of all parties concerned and from considering evi-
dence proffered by them upon the relevant points of the case. In other
words, the rule was adopted to secure not routine approval of a consent
decree, but in order to insure supervision of the court for the protection
of the corporation and all the stockholders.
Id. at 725.
12. See Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 67; Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307; Cohen, 127 F.2d at
724.
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When the court approves the proposed settlement over the non-
party shareholders' objections, some shareholders may try to appeal
that decision. The question then arises whether a shareholder who
has not been formally made a party to the action by intervening under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, but who has appeared, pursuant to
court notice, to voice his objections to the proposed settlement, may
appeal the district court's approval of the settlement reached between
the named parties.
This note argues that the Seventh Circuit's recent holding in
Felzen v. Andreas,13 which was affirmed by an equally divided Su-
preme Court,14 and which requires nonparty shareholders to inter-
vene before they will be allowed to appeal, will result in the most
benefit to the corporation. Before reaching this conclusion, however,
Part II will review not only Felzen, but the case law leading up to it
and one case that was decided after it. Part III will then describe the
two main problems that result from class and derivative actions and
will set forth and explain the argument of this note: that the rule re-
quiring intervention provides the best solution to these problems.
Part IV will provide further support for this conclusion by illustrating
how it will benefit the corporation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Before Felzen
1. Class Actions
Although this analysis focuses on nonparty appeals of derivative
actions, how courts have handled the appeals of unnamed class mem-
bers is particularly relevant to determining whether nonparty share-
holders should be required to intervene before they will be allowed to
appeal a district court's approval of a settlement agreement. In fact,
when determining whether a nonparty shareholder may appeal with-
out intervening, many courts have not even distinguished between the
two actions.1 5 In addition, since the two actions involve the same
problems,16 how the courts have handled these problems in the class
action setting is instructive.
In Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co.,17 the Seventh Circuit de-
cided the first of what would become a line of related cases leading to
its recent decision in Felzen. There, the plaintiff brought a patent in-
fringement action, naming six companies as defendants and repre-
13. 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).
14. See California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994).
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
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sentatives of a class of alleged infringers.1 8 Eventually, the plaintiff
reached a settlement with the named defendants. After a hearing
during which the appellants, who were unnamed class members,
made no objections, the court entered a consent judgment. Dismissing
the appellants' appeal, the court stated that "[ilf a class member inter-
venes or even appears in response to a notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(e) and objects to the dismissal or compromise, he has a right to
appeal from an adverse final judgment."19 Significantly, however, the
court mentioned in a footnote that the appellants' failure to intervene
after receipt of notice before the final judgment foreclosed their right
to appeal.2 0 Recognizing the inconsistency of the two positions taken
by the court, subsequent courts reviewing the judgment have ignored
the footnote.2 1
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Research Corp. in
two subsequent cases. The first case was Patterson v. Stovall,2 2 where
the issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ap-
proving the settlement agreement reached between the parties.2 3 The
appellants in that case were unnamed class members who had ob-
jected to the settlement in the district court. In a footnote, the court
noted that "there is no doubt that the objectors have standing to ap-
peal."24 Similarly, in Armstrong v. Board of School Directors,2 5 the
court stated that the right of a class member to appeal "exists inde-
pendent of any motion made in the district court."26
The Third Circuit reached a similar result in Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.27 This case was unique in that the class
members were given the opportunity to decide whether to join the
class after they were informed of the substantial terms of the settle-
ment. The court recognized that "[ordinarily, aggrieved class mem-
bers may appeal any final order of a district court in proceedings held
18. See id. at 1059.
19. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
20. See id. at 1060 n.2.
21. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875; Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 679
(8th Cir. 1992) ("Later cases have ignored this footnote and have relied on the
text of Research Corp. to perpetuate the rule that an unnamed class member-
objector may appeal from a class action judgment."); Armstrong v. Board of
School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 327 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that in Research, "this
court held that an unnamed class member who appears in response to a Rule
23(e) notice and objects to a settlement has a right to appeal from an adverse
judgment").
22. 528 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1976).
23. See id. at 109.
24. Id. at 109 n.1.
25. 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 327.
27. 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
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pursuant to Rule 23."28 Even in this unusual situation, the court up-
held that rule. It recognized that where potential class members may
elect to join the class knowing the settlement terms, there may be less
of a need to police settlements. 2 9 Nonetheless, the court also recog-
nized that small claimants might not have a real choice regarding
whether to join the class since "many small claimants frequently have
no litigable claims unless aggregated."3 0 Thus, unless allowed to ap-
peal, they would be faced with a no-win situation - either opt out and
receive nothing or join the class and be stuck with an unfair settle-
ment.3 1 Accordingly, the court held that even in this situation, a class
member had the right to appeal.32
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether a class member could appeal
the district court's approval of a settlement agreement in Marshall v.
Holiday Magic, Inc.33 After first determining that the appellants
were class members, the court stated that, as such, their legal rights
were "affected by the settlement and they have standing to sue."34 In
support of its holding, the court cited Ace Heating. Although objec-
tions were filed in opposition to the settlement, it appears that none
were filed by the appellants.3 5 Accordingly, the Marshall court's con-
clusion could be read to extend not only to those parties who objected
to the proposed settlement, but also to those who did not. The holding
in Ace Heating appears to be equally unrestrained.
In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit decided Guthrie v. Evans.36 This
case has become the foundation upon which a number of subsequent
courts have based their decisions.37 Additionally, it marks a distinct
turning point in the previous trend of allowing objecting class mem-
bers to appeal a district court judgment without intervening. 38 In
28. Id. at 32.
29. See id. at 32-33.
30. Id. at 33.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. 550 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. Id. at 1176.
35. See id.
36. 815 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1987).
37. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1993) (setting out and apply-
ing the Guthrie test); In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Sec. Litig., 976 F.2d 362, 368
(7th Cir. 1992) ("[W~e find Guthrie's analysis persuasive where an unnamed class
member ... is appealing a post-settlement order implementing the settlement
agreement."); Croyden Assocs., 969 F.2d at 680 ("We believe that Guthrie and
Walker are persuasive authority and we see no decision that has pointed to a flaw
in their analysis."); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1073-74 (5th Cir.
1988) (stating that the court was persuaded by the reasoning in Guthrie). But see
Shults, 35 F.3d at 1061 (recognizing Guthrie's reasoning, but allowing some
exceptions).
38. See Shults, 35 F.3d at 1059 (noting that Guthrie is "the case that appears to be
the progenitor of the modern trend in the federal courts" in cases where unnamed
[Vol. 79:171
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Guthrie, an unnamed class member in a class action challenging the
confinement conditions at Georgia State Prison appealed the district
court's final judgment, which permanently enjoined the defendants
from violating prior orders of the court.39 The court, addressing this
issue for the first time, held that there were three reasons why an
unnamed class member who had not intervened did not have standing
to appeal a final district court judgment that was binding on the class
members.
First, the court did not find that the appellant would fairly and
adequatel represent the class. Since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) requires a finding by the district court that a representative of
the class will "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class,"40 and since this determination had not been made regarding
the appellant, he had "no standing to take any action on behalf of the
class."41
Second, there are other avenues of relief for an unnamed class
member who disagrees with the course of the class action. The court
recognized three such avenues. First, a class member could intervene
as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.42 This, the court stated, would allow class members to "moni-
tor the representation of their rights."43 The court also recognized
that a denial of a motion to intervene of right is appealable.44 Second,
if an unnamed class member was not adequately represented by the
class representative, she would be able pursue relief in a collateral
proceeding.45 Finally, although not applicable to a Rule 23(b)(2) ac-
tion, which was the type of action before the court, a class member in a
Rule 23(b)(3) action may opt out of the class. 4 6 By opting out of the
class, a class member will not be bound by the litigation or the final
judgment.47
Third and finally, "allowing direct appeals by individual class
members who have not intervened in the district court would defeat
the very purpose of class action lawsuits."48 To reach this conclusion,
class members attempt to appeal without first intervening); Croyden Assocs., 969
F.2d at 680 (recognizing that most cases advocating a rule that unnamed class
members could appeal without first intervening where decided before Guthrie).
39. See 815 F.2d at 627.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
41. 815 F.2d at 628.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id. This is important to keep in mind, for it is an important factor that later
courts have used to partially justify intervention. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S.
301, 304 (1988); Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
45. See 815 F.2d at 628.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 629.
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the court recognized that the "fundamental purpose" of the class ac-
tion is to allow the efficient resolution of a large number of similar
suits that would otherwise be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 49 Sim-
ilarly, "[i]f each class member could appeal individually, the litigation
could become unwieldy."50
The decision of the Supreme Court in Marino v. Ortiz,15 like Guth-
rie, has also had a significant impact on subsequent cases. 52 However,
in spite of how some courts have interpreted Marino, it did not decide
whether an unnamed class member or a nonparty shareholder could
appeal a consent decree entered by the district court without first in-
tervening. Rather, the Court determined whether strangers to an ac-
tion who had objected to the approval of the settlement could appeal
without first intervening. 5 3 Groups representing minority members
who had passed a police sergeant's examination at disproportionately
low rates brought a Title VII lawsuit against the New York City Police
Department.54 After several groups intervened in the action, the par-
ties reached a settlement that the court then approved. The petition-
ers were a group of white police officers who had objected to the
settlement at the hearing, but did not attempt to intervene. The
Court held that since they were not parties to the underlying lawsuit
and did not intervene, they could not appeal: "The rule that only par-
ties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an
adverse judgment is well settled."55 The Court then went on to state
that in spite of the exception recognized by the Court of Appeals,
namely, that a nonparty may appeal if he has an interest that is af-
fected by the judgment of the trial court, "the better practice is for
such a nonparty to seek intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of
such motions are, of course, appealable."5 6
Approximately twenty-two years after its decision in Research
Corp., the Seventh Circuit faced a similar question in In re VMS Lim-
ited Partnership Securities Litigation.5 7 This time, however, instead
of considering whether an unnamed class member who had not inter-
vened could appeal the district court's consent decree approving a set-
tlement agreement, the court considered whether an unnamed class
member who had not intervened could appeal the district court's post-
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. 484 U.S. 301 (1988).
52. See, e.g., Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1998); In re VMS Ltd.
Partnership Sec. Litig., 976 F.2d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 1992); Walker v. City of Mes-
quite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1988).
53. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
54. See id. at 302-03.
55. Id. at 304.
56. Id.
57. 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992).
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settlement order implementing the settlement agreement. The court
ultimately held that despite the appellant's "interest and participation
in this Class Action prior to and after settlement, [the appellant] was
not a named plaintiff in the Class Action; [the appellant's] posture as
an unnamed Class member curtails its right to appeal."5 8
In holding as it did, the court stated that although the appellant
"could have appealed the district court's approval of the Settlement
Agreement under Research Corp., we decline to expand Research
Corp.'s holding to allow the appeal of post-judgment orders by un-
named class members."5 9 Instead, the court found the reasoning in
Guthrie to be more appropriate.6 0 First, the appellant represented its
own interest rather than the interest of the class; and even if it did
represent the class, there was no determination by the court that it
protected the interests of the class as required by Rule 23(a).6 1 Sec-
ond, allowing the appellant to appeal in this case would "wholly
thwart the purpose behind class actions." 62 Finally, the court recog-
nized that the appellant had other avenues of relief.63
Following In re VMS Limited Partnership Securities Litigation, the
Seventh Circuit was again confronted with the attempts of unnamed
class members who had not intervened to appeal a district court's
judgment. In In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litiga-
tion,6 4 plaintiffs brought an antitrust class action against numerous
manufacturers and wholesalers of pharmaceuticals. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the wholesalers, which re-
sulted in appeals from two groups of plaintiffs.65 One group consisted
of previous class members who had opted out of the class action, and
58. Id. at 367.
59. Id. at 369.
60. The court stated in a footnote that it offered 'no opinion on the merit of Guthrie's
principle as applied to an unnamed class member who appeals the approval of a
consent decree." Id. at 368 n.8. 'That is not the issue in this case, and further-
more, Research Corp. still controls that issue in this circuit." Id. It should be
noted that the court changed its view in Felzen when it stated that "the distinc-
tion is inconsequential for purposes of Rule 3(c), the rationale of Marino, and the
rationale of Brand Name Prescription Drugs: that the court should not 'fragment
the control of the class action' by allowing class members to usurp the role of the
class representative without persuading the district judge that the representa-
tive is unfit or unfaithful, or that subclasses should be created." Felzen v. An-
dreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998)(citations omitted) (quoting In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 115 F.3d 458, 457 (7th Cir. 1997)).
61. See In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Sec. Litig., 976 F.2d 362, 368 (7th Cir. 1992).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 368-69. Although the court recognized that there were other avenues of
relief, it did not specify them because it felt that the appellant had able counsel
and because it did "not desire to encourage one or more avenues of alternative
litigation." Id.
64. 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. See id. at 457.
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who had brought their own suits against the manufacturers but not
the wholesalers. The other group consisted of unnamed class mem-
bers. With regard to the opt-outs, the court essentially held that by
opting out the appellants were no longer parties to the class action
and thus fell directly under Marino, which requires nonparties to in-
tervene before they can appeal.6 6 The court held that the other appel-
lants could not appeal either because allowing them to do so would
"fragment the control of the class action."67 The court held that un-
named class members must intervene before they will be allowed to
appeal.68 In support of its holding, the court recognized four alterna-
tive avenues of relief available to unnamed class members who are
unsatisfied with the representation of the class representatives. In
addition to the three avenues of relief mentioned in Guthrie,69 the
court stated that class members could "seek the creation of a sepa-
rately represented subclass." 70
2. Derivative Suits
Unlike the situation where unnamed class members attempt to ap-
peal a settlement agreement reached by the named parties and ap-
proved by the district court, there are only a few cases that deal with
whether a nonparty shareholder can appeal a district court's approval
of a settlement reached between the named parties. Before Felzen,
there were really only three significant decisions. Each of these, con-
trary to Felzen, allowed a nonparty shareholder who had objected to
the settlement to appeal the district court's approval of it.
The first in the line of cases was Cohen v. Young.7 i There, a share-
holder brought a derivative suit alleging illegal activity by some of the
corporation's directors, officers, and employees. Eventually, the par-
ties agreed on a settlement. In compliance with the notice require-
ment of what was then Rule 23(c), 72 the court sent all the
shareholders an "order to show cause why the proposed settlement
should not be approved."73 In response to this notice, the appellant
66. See id.
67. Id. "If class members can file their own appeals, the coherence of the class is
destroyed, the scope of the class action becomes unclear, and the control over the
action becomes divided and confused." Id. at 458.
68. See id.
69. The three avenues of relief mentioned in Guthrie are as follows: (1) Class mem-
bers can move to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) In the case of inadequate representation, the class
member may pursue relief in a collateral proceeding; and (3) In a Rule 23(b)(3)
action, the class member may opt-out of the class. See Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d
626, 628-29 (11th Cir. 1987).
70. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 115 F.3d at 457-58.
71. 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942).
72. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
73. 127 F.2d at 723.
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appeared to object to the settlement and filed a motion to intervene.74
The motion to intervene was denied, and the appellant made no at-
tempt to appeal the denial.75 Instead, he appealed the final decree of
the district court approving the settlement.76 Allowing the nonparty
shareholder to appeal, the court stated that he was "like a defendant
who is summoned by process of court and after an adverse ruling has
the right to appeal."77
A number of years later, the Seventh Circuit decided Tryforos v.
Icarian Development Co.,78 in which a nonparty shareholder appealed
the district court's approval of a settlement reached by the named par-
ties. The issue in that case, however, was not whether the nonparty
shareholder could appeal, but whether in fact he had objected.79 Rely-
ing on Cohen, the court stated in a footnote that "[t]he law is clear that
a non-party shareholder who appears, pursuant to a Rule 23.1 notice,
to present objections to a proposed dismissal or settlement of a deriva-
tive action may appeal an adverse decision even though he has not
been formally made a party to the action."80 The court also stated
that "no such appeal may be taken by a shareholder who has failed to
make such an appearance."Si
Although both of the previous cases were significant, they were not
very helpful because the courts provided little explanation for their
conclusions. This changed, however, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger,8 2
when the Third Circuit faced the issue of whether a nonintervening,
nonparty shareholder could appeal. The appellants were shareholders
who had brought a separate derivative action in state court that would
have been precluded by the settlement reached between the named
parties in the case that was before the court.8 3 Following the district
court's approval of the settlement over the appellants' objections, they
appealed. In response, the plaintiffs argued that the appellants did
not have standing to appeal because they were not named parties and
did not intervene. However, the court disagreed.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 724.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting Pianta v. H. M. Reich Co., 77 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir. 1935)). Stated
more directly, "an unnamed member of a derivative suit who has not been al-
lowed to intervene may nonetheless have standing to appeal if the district court
has haled him into court." Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1060
(6th Cir. 1994).
78. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975). As discussed infra Part lI.B.2, this decision was
overruled in Felzen.
79. See id at 1263.
80. Id. at 1263 n.22.
81. Id.
82. 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. See id. at 1306-07.
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To answer the question before it, the court reviewed how other
courts had answered the related question of whether unnamed class
members may appeal a settlement agreement reached by the named
parties. In doing so, the court noted in a footnote that they were not
deciding "whether different rules apply to objector appellate standing
in class and derivative suits."8 4 They did mention, however, that "one
of the rationales offered in support of an intervention requirement
cannot apply to derivative actions."8 5 This rationale is that Rule
23(b)(3) class members may opt out of the class and pursue their own
actions, whereas shareholders are not given that option.8 6
In support of its decision to allow the objecting shareholder to ap-
peal without first intervening, the court held that "'agency costs' in-
herent in class and derivative actions"8 7 "caution[ I against creating
obstacles to challenging derivative action settlement agreements."8 8
Agency costs result from "the divergence of attorneys' incentives from
shareholder interests."8 9 Since shareholders bring a derivative action
for the benefit of the corporation, the return for the individual share-
holder, if any, will be in the form of increased share value. 90 This
increased value of the stock will normally be relatively small. Conse-
quently, "the costs of policing [and monitoring the attorney and the
settlement] typically outweigh any pro rata benefits to the share-
holder."9 1 Accordingly, the shareholder is "neither well-situated nor
adequately motivated to closely monitor and control the attorney."92
As a result, there is an increased risk that the plaintiffs' attorney and
the defendants will reach a settlement that provides little benefit to
the corporation while providing high fees for the attorney.9 3 This con-
certed effort between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant aug-
ments the situation by essentially circumventing the check that Rule
23.1 puts on settlement agreements: judicial approval.94 "In seeking
court approval of their settlement proposal, plaintiffs' attorneys' and
defendants' interests coalesce and mutual interest may result in mu-
tual indulgence."9 5 Accordingly, the parties will tend to "spotlight the
proposal's strengths and slight its defects."96 This works to eliminate
84. Id. at 1307-08 n.4.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1309.
88. Id. at 1310.
89. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 69 (1991).
90. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1310.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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"the full benefit of the adversarial process."97 "In such circumstances,
objectors play an important role by giving courts access to information
on the settlement's merits."9 8
Because of their important role, the court held that objectors
should be able to appeal without being required to intervene. Recog-
nizing the potential problems with allowing nonparties to appeal with-
out intervening, the court stated that "[aissuring fair and adequate
settlements outweighs concerns that non-intervening objectors will
render the representative litigation 'unwieldy.'"99
In Rosenbaum v. MacAllister,100 the situation presented for the
court's review was slightly different than that of the cases above.
There, both a class action and a derivative suit were brought against
the defendants.O1 Eventually, the parties reached a settlement, and
notice thereof was sent to the class members and the shareholders.i02
In response to the notice, the appellant, who was both a class member
and a shareholder, appeared and objected only to the attorney's
fees.10 3 Nevertheless, the court approved the settlement. On appeal,
the appellant, who at no time moved to intervene, argued that he had
standing to appeal as both a class member and as a shareholder.104
Before addressing the issue, the court noted that its decision in
Gottlieb v. Wilesi05 established that a class member had to intervene
before he could appeal the district court's approval of the settle-
ment.10 6 However, the court stated "that the most important ratio-
nales underpinning the rule that only intervenors may appeal the
approval of the settlement itself do not apply to appeals of awards of
attorney's fees and expenses to class counsel."10 7 When the court al-
lows just one unnamed class member to appeal the approval of a set-
tlement, this postpones any benefit to the class members as well as
the defendant's elimination of its liability.108 The result is mitigated
when the court allows an unnamed class member to appeal just the
attorneys' fees. In that case, the only party affected would be the at-
torneys.' 09 Thus, the court essentially separates the settlement por-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Essentially, the court was saying that the concern for agency costs outweighs
the collective action concerns. See infra Part llI.A.
100. 64 F.3d 1439 (10th Cir. 1995).
101. See id. at 1441.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
106. See 64 F.3d at 1442.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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tion of the agreement from the attorney's fees portion, and promotes
their separate treatment.
The court stated three reasons why a nonintervening class member
should be allowed to appeal the award of attorneys' fees. First, the
class representative is not in a good position to resist excessive fee
requests by the plaintiffs' attorney since in many cases the lawyers
recruit the class representative." 0 Second, when notice of the settle-
ment is sent out, it usually states only an "outside limit for attorney's
fees," with the expectation that the attorney's fees will be set after
considering the evidence and objections of the class members."' Ac-
cordingly, the court did not feel "that a class member who is satisfied
with the settlement should have to intervene because of the possibility
the court might award an unreasonable attorney's fee." 1 12 Finally,
the opt out feature is not available to a class member unsatisfied with
just the award of attorney's fees, because by the time the attorney's
fees are determined, it is too late to opt out.' 1 3 The court then stated
that "[t]he same considerations apply even more clearly in the context
of a shareholders' derivative suit," when the nonparty shareholder
wants to appeal only the attorney's fee portion of the settlement.n 4
Accordingly, the court allowed the shareholder/class member to ap-
peal even though he failed to intervene. However, the court did not
make clear whether it allowed him to appeal because he was a class
member, because he was a shareholder, or because he was both.
The relevant cases leading to Felzen present two major themes."i 5
First, the trend in a growing number of courts is to require unnamed
class members to intervene before they will be allowed to appeal. The
courts reason that the intervention requirement prevents the "un-
wieldy" litigation problems that work to undermine the purpose of the
class action mechanism. In addition, the option available to class
members to opt out provides them with an alternative avenue of relief
if they feel that the settlement reached by the representative is unfair.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1443.
113. See id.
114. Id. In support of that statement, the court stated the following:
There is no opt out possibility. The benefits of the settlement inure to
the corporation and hence only indirectly to the shareholder. The attor-
neys for the named representative are entitled to a fair fee; but an ap-
peal of the court's fee award - to be paid out of the corporate treasury -
would seem not to delay the benefits of the settlement.
Id.(footnote omitted).
115. It should be noted that the list of cases discussed in this section is far from ex-
haustive. There are numerous other cases, particularly in the class action area,
that address the relevant issues. However, as these cases add little more than
the listed cases, they are not discussed.
[Vol. 79:171
FELZEN V. ANDREAS
The second theme is that derivative actions present a different sit-
uation than do class actions. Like the situation in class actions, there
is the possibility of "unwieldy" litigation if the ability of shareholders
to appeal is unrestrained. However, shareholders that are dissatisfied
with the representation in a derivative suit lack the option to opt out
and are thus stuck with the settlement reached by the representative.
Because of this lack of an alternative avenue of relief, the courts have
determined that it should be easier for shareholders to appeal. Ac-
cordingly, there appear to be no cases that require shareholders to in-
tervene before they can appeal the district court's approval of a
settlement, that is, until Felzen.
B. Felzen
1. Facts
On June 28, 1995, the day after FBI agents raided the corporate
headquarters of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and the homes of its
top executives, ADM announced that it was the subject of three sepa-
rate federal grand jury investigations, which were inquiring into
whether ADM had conspired with rival businesses to fix the price of
certain products."i 6 Eventually, ADM pled guilty to criminal anti-
trust charges and was required to pay a fine of $100 million."i 7 ADM
also spent an additional $90 million to settle three civil antitrust law-
suits that were brought by its competitors." 8 Shortly after the an-
nouncement of the grand jury investigations, numerous shareholders
filed derivative actions against ADM's directors, alleging that they en-
gaged in gross mismanagement by failing to properly supervise com-
pany employees.11 9 The plaintiffs' aim was to recover the $190
million that ADM was required to pay for the criminal antitrust viola-
tion fine and the civil action settlements.120 After six months of nego-
tiation, the parties agreed to a settlement.' 2 ' Essentially, the
plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to release any cause of action against ADM
and the defendant directors in return for $8 million and an agreement
to make various corporate governance reforms.i 22
116. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v.
Felzen, 525 U.S. 315 (1999).
117. See id. at 3.
118. See id. at 6.
119. See id. at 5. The two actions that resulted in the present case were brought and
then consolidated in Illinois. See Brief for Respondent (ADM) at 1-2, California
Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 525 U.S. 315 (1999). Fourteen other
actions were brought, and later consolidated, in Delaware, where ADM was incor-
porated. Id. at 2.
120. See Brief for Petitioners at 5.
121. See Brief for Respondent (ADM) at 2.
122. See Brief for Petitioners at 6-7. All of the eight million dollars was to be allocated
to pay attorneys' fees. Almost half of it was designated to plaintiffs' attorneys.
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As required by Rule 23.1, a notice of the proposed settlement was
sent to the shareholders directing them to appear if they had any ob-
jections to the proposed settlement.1 23 In response to the notification,
California Public Employees' Retirement System and Florida State
Board of Administration, both shareholders who were not named in
the derivative action, appeared to make their objections to the pro-
posed settlement. The basis for their objections was that the settle-
ment provided very little benefit to the corporation. The district court
heard their objections along with those of five other shareholders,124
but nonetheless approved the proposed settlement. Without making
any attempt to intervene, California Public Employees' Retirement
System and Florida State Board of Administration appealed the dis-
trict court's approval of the settlement.
2. Decision of the Seventh Circuit
The issue before the court was whether a nonparty shareholder
who had not intervened, but who had appeared to object to a proposed
settlement, could appeal the district court's approval of a settlement
agreement that was reached between the named parties in the deriva-
tive action.1 2 5 Answering the question in the negative, the court
rested its decision on two main grounds: the Supreme Court's holding
in Marino and the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 3(c).126 Thus, this overview of the court's decision will be divided
into two corresponding sections.
Marino Ground
Using Marino as the core of its analysis, the court undertook what
was essentially a three-step process to conclude that a nonparty
shareholder must intervene before she can appeal the approval of the
settlement agreement by the district court. The first step the court
took was to apply Marino to the situation where an unnamed class
member fails to intervene, but nevertheless attempts to appeal the
district court's approval of a class action settlement. 12 7 The court
then distinguished the position of an unnamed class member in a class
action from that of a nonparty shareholder in a derivative action to
conclude that a nonparty shareholder has a weaker claim with regard
to the considerations that weigh against an intervention require-
The other half was to be used for future legal fees that would be incurred by ADM
in making the agreed to reformations. See id.
123. See id. at 7.
124. See Brief for Respondent (ADM) at n.6.
125. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874.
126. FED. R. App. P. 3(c).
127. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 874-75.
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ment.128 The final step the court took was to conclude that since un-
named class members must intervene before they may to appeal, then
nonparty shareholders, who have a weaker claim, should also be re-
quired to intervene before they can appeal a district court's approval
of a settlement.129
Step One: Unnamed Class Members are Required to Intervene
Judge Easterbrook began his opinion with a quote from Marino:
The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties,
may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled. The Court of Appeals sug-
gested that there may be exceptions to this general rule, primarily "when the
nonparty has an interest that is affected by the trial court's judgment." We
think the better practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for pur-
poses of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course, appealable.
1 3 0
The court interpreted those words to mean that "a person adversely
affected by the settlement of a class action may appeal from the con-
sent decree based on that settlement only if he has intervened as a
party."'131 However, the court also noted that, prior to Marino, it had
"permitted class members and stockholders to appeal, whether or not
they had intervened, provided they had informed the district court of
their objections to the decision that disadvantaged them."132 With
this in mind, the court was quick to point out that its holding in Re-
search Corp., which allowed the appeal of an unnamed class member
who had appeared in court to object to the settlement, was no longer
authoritative, especially in light of two of its more recent opinions.
These two opinions, In re VMS Limited Partnership Securities Litiga-
tion133 and In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litiga-
tion,134 both stood for the proposition that unnamed class members
were required to intervene before they would be allowed to appeal.
The appellants argued that since VMS involved the appeal of a
post-settlement order and Brand Name involved the appeal of a sum-
mary judgment, neither case applied to the situation before the court
because neither dealt with an appeal from an approval of a settlement
agreement. The court rejected this argument and stated:
IT]he distinction is inconsequential for purposes of Rule 3(c), the rationale of
Marino, and the rationale of Brand Name Prescription Drugs: that the court
should not 'fragment the control of the class action' by allowing class members
to usurp the role of the class representative without persuading the district
128. See id. at 875-76.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 874 (quoting Marino, 484 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 976 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992).
134. 115 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997).
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judge that the representative is unfit or unfaithful, or that subclasses should
be created. 1 3
5
The court specifically overruled Research Corp. and any other case in
the circuit that would permit a nonparty to appeal "from a decision of
any kind in a class action." 13 6
Despite the intervening precedent and the language of Rule 3(c),
the appellants argued that the rule set forth in Tryforos v. Icarian
Development Company' 37 should apply. In that case, the court stated
in a footnote that "a non-party shareholder who appears, pursuant to
a Rule 23.1 notice, to present objections to a proposed dismissal or
settlement of a derivative action may appeal an adverse decision even
though he has not been formally made a party to the action."138 The
court rejected this argument because the issue in that case was not
the same as the issue sub judice, and also because the support for that
court's statement was minimal.' 3 9 The Tryforos court cited only two
cases: one was a case from the 1940s that allowed nonparty appeals,
but did not give any reasons for its holding, while the other was a
district court case, which, as Judge Easterbrook stated, was "an odd
reference for a rule of appellate jurisdiction.140 Justifying the rejec-
tion, the court stated that "[ain unexplained practice does not offer
shelter from a later opinion of the Supreme Court holding that only
parties may appeal, and withdrawing from the appellate courts any
exception-making power."14'
The appellants also argued the rather basic point that "erroneous
decisions should be reversed."'14 2 The basis of this argument was that
by necessitating the additional burden of intervention, shareholders
will be less likely to appeal. Accordingly, erroneous decisions of the
district court will go unreviewed. The court rejected this argument,
however, by simply stating that "[a] court of appeals is not an
ombudsman."'14 3 This is essentially the fairness argument to which
the Bell Atlantic court deferred. The Felzen court was not swayed by
the reasoning that the possibility of an unfair settlement necessitates
making appeals easier.
135. 134 F.3d at 875 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs, 115 F.3d at 457).
136. Id.
137. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975).
138. Id. at 1263 n.22.
139. See 134 F.3d at 874.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Step Two: Distinguishing Class Actions and Derivative
Actions
Following the determination that Marino required unnamed class
members to intervene to appeal any kind of decision, the court pro-
ceeded to the second step of its analysis: to distinguish between share-
holders and class members. Ultimately, the court found that as far as
Rule 3(c) or Marino is concerned, there is no difference between a
shareholder's derivative action under Rule 23.1 and a class action
under Rule 23 that would permit appeals by nonparty
shareholders.144
Although the court recognized differences between a shareholder's
derivative action under Rule 23.1 and a class action under Rule 23, it
held that shareholders had a weaker claim toward allowing nonparty
appeals. The main distinction the court recognized was that all class
members are equally entitled to litigate, or in other words, each has a
"real grievance with the defendant,"'14 5 whereas in the shareholder de-
rivative action, the "individual investor is not an injured party."146
The injured party in a derivative suit is the corporation. The investor
bringing the action does so under the corporation's right to recover for
an injury, not his own. The court held that this difference set up "at
least an equitable argument for a class member who wants to
appeal."147
In support of its distinction between class members and sharehold-
ers and its conclusion that nonparty shareholders have the weaker
claim, the court mentions two characteristics of corporations. First,
when an investor invests in a corporation, she places her funds at the
management's disposal.148 In return for this investment, she gets the
right to choose future management. Thus, by investing in a certain
corporation, the investor takes a risk, which is partially alleviated by
the investor's role in selecting the future management. Second, deriv-
ative suits "do little to promote sound management and often hurt the
firm by diverting the managers' time from running the business while
diverting the firm's resources to plaintiffs' lawyers without providing
a corresponding benefit."14 9
In light of the distinctions between class members and sharehold-
ers and the characteristics of derivative suits and the corporate man-
agement structure, the court determined that nonparty shareholders
144. See id. at 875.
145. Id. The court also recognized that "which injured persons become the representa-
tives, and which the 'mere' class members is to a degree fortuitous and to a de-
gree dependent on the entrepreneurial activity of the class counsel." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 876.
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have a weaker claim for escaping the intervention requirement than
do class members.15o
Step Three: Apply Rule for Class Actions to Derivative Suits
Once the court had determined that nonparty shareholders had a
weaker claim regarding the elimination of the intervention require-
ment, its final step was to apply the rule for unnamed class members
in class actions to nonparty shareholders in derivative actions. Hav-
ing a weaker claim, nonparty shareholders have an even less persua-
sive argument that intervention should not be a necessary predicate
to an appeal. Accordingly, since class members are required to inter-
vene, the court determined that nonparty shareholders should also be
required to intervene before they will be allowed to appeal a settle-
ment approved by the district court.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) Ground
The second major ground on which the court based its decision was
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c). Rule 3(c) states that "[a]
notice of appeal must specify the party or parties taking the appeal by
naming each appellant in either the caption or the body of the notice of
appeal."151 The court quoted this language in the first paragraph of its
opinion and referred to the rule several times as a basis for its deci-
sion. However, the court failed to explain how or why Rule 3(c) sup-
ported its decision.
The court's reliance on Rule 3(c) as a basis for its decision was most
likely taken from the Supreme Court's opinion in Marino. In Marino,
the Court cited the rule after it had determined that only parties to a
lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse
judgment. 152 Thus, it appears that the Court used Rule 3(c) to sup-
port that statement. Again, however, the Court failed to explain how
Rule 3(c) had any significance in determining whether a nonparty
may appeal an adverse judgment. Since neither court explained its
usage of Rule 3(c), it remains unclear how or why the rule supports
either outcome.
C. After Felzen
Although the Felzen decision was fairly recent, at least one case
has confronted a similar issue more recently. In Kaplan v. Rand,153
the court considered whether a nonparty shareholder who had ob-
jected, but failed to intervene, could appeal the district court's ap-
150. See id.
151. FED. R. App. P. 3(c)
152. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988).
153. 192 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1999).
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proval of the attorney's fees portion of a settlement agreement.I5 4 In
reaching its decision, the court expressly refused to abide by the hold-
ing in Felzen.155
The Second Circuit determined whether an objecting, nonparty
shareholder may appeal by determining if the shareholder is "af-
fected" by the settlement. "Although the general rule is that only a
party of record may appeal a judgment, a nonparty may appeal 'when
the nonparty has an interest that is affected by the trial court's judg-
ment.'"1 5 6 Accordingly, the court found that because the payment of
attorney's fees out of the corporate funds affected "the well-being of
the corporation," the interests of all the shareholders were affected. 157
As a result, it allowed the nonparty shareholder to appeal without
intervening.
In rejecting the application of Felzen, which the plaintiffs' attor-
neys urged the court to accept, the court noted that Felzen was based
primarily on Marino.1 5 8 Accordingly, to get around Felzen, the court
attacked its foundation, Marino. The court first distinguished Marino
by noting that, unlike the nonparty shareholder sub judice, the appel-
lants in Marino were not affected by the settlement.15 9 The court
then stated the following:
It is significant that the Supreme Court did not reject our rule permitting
appeal by nonparties with affected interests. It merely identified intervention
as "the better practice." Indeed, the later affirmance of Felzen by an equally
divided Supreme Court demonstrates that the Court has yet to reject a rule
that allows an appeal by a nonparty having an interest affected by the judg-
ment of the trial court.
1 6 0
Thus, this court seems to feel that the "better practice" language in
Marino indicates a preferred practice rather than a required one.
III. EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION
As seen from the review of the cases dealing with the appeals of
nonparty shareholders that have failed to intervene, Felzen goes
against all of these by requiring intervention. Although the method
by which the court reached this conclusion is subject to a great deal of
154. See id. at 60.
155. See id. at 67.
156. Id. (quoting United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 931 F.2d 177, 183-
84 (2d Cir. 1991)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 67-68.
159. See id. at 68. For a discussion of Marino, see supra Part lI.A.1. The court noted
that the appellants in Marino would not have been entitled to a promotion even if
the settlement were invalidated. Consequently, they did not have an interest
that was affected by the settlement. See id.
160. Id.
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criticism,16' this note argues that its ultimate holding is correct. This
note focuses not on the analysis the court undertook to reach its hold-
ing, but rather on the practical effect of the court's holding on deriva-
tive litigation. This section will first discuss the major problems that
accompany class and derivative actions. It will then set forth the ar-
gument that has been used by most courts and commentators to sup-
port the rule that requires only that nonparty shareholders object to
the settlement before they will be allowed to appeal. The third section
will illustrate the problems with that argument and show why an in-
tervention requirement will result in a more preferable outcome.
A. The Problems of the Derivative Action
Before any solution to the problems inherent in derivative actions
can be addressed, it is first necessary to understand the problems. Al-
though the class and derivative actions have the same problems, the
different rules governing each type of action require separate analysis.
This note will focus on the solution to those problems in the derivative
action context. There are two main problems that arise in both class
and derivative actions. One involves the agency costs associated with
the settlement of those suits, and the other involves the problems
stemming from collective actions.
Agency costs are those costs resulting from the "divergence of at-
torneys' incentives from shareholder interests."' 62 As the Bell Atlan-
tic court mentioned, these costs occur because of the lack of incentive
and motivation of the shareholder to monitor the attorney.16 3 This
lack of incentive and motivation stems from the fact that the costs of
monitoring will most likely exceed any benefit the shareholder will
receive from the settlement. 6 4 This is because the benefit of monitor-
ing the attorney will be spread out amongst all the shareholders,
while the costs of monitoring will be borne by the individual share-
holder that does the monitoring.' 6 5 Without any monitoring by the
shareholder, the attorney will likely pursue her own interests rather
161. See Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Chal-
lenge Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REv. 81,
111-118 (1998) ("The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Felzen is somewhat prob-
lematic."); Rory Zack Fazendeiro, Note & Comment, Felzen v. Andreas: The Sev-
enth Circuit Shuts its Doors to Derivative-Suit Appeals by Unnamed
Shareholders, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 533, 572-589 (1999) ("Felzen was
wrongly decided by the Seventh Circuit").
162. Romano, supra note 89, at 69.
163. See 2 F.3d at 1309-10; see, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1991);
Fazendeiro, supra note 161, at 588.
164. See Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309.
165. See Macey & Miller, supra note 163, at 19-20.
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than that of the shareholders.166 Accordingly, the attorney will likely
reach a settlement with the defendants that provides little benefit to
the corporation and significant benefit to the attorney.1 67 The agency
costs represent the difference between the benefits the corporation
would have received under the settlement had the attorney's interest
been aligned with the shareholders and the benefit the corporation
actually received. This is one of the major problems of not only deriva-
tive actions, but class actions as well.
There is one important feature available to class members in class
actions that is not available to shareholders in derivative suits. 1 68
This feature is the rule that unnamed class members may opt out of
the class if they for some reason do not want to be part of it.169 "Any
class members who choose to opt out will not be bound by any judg-
ment or settlement that is reached in the case."1 70 Accordingly, this
device works as a check on the plaintiff's attorney by providing class
members with the option to exclude themselves from the effect of any
settlement proposed by the attorney.171 As a result, the problems of
agency costs are reduced. This option, however, cannot be used by
shareholders who wish to exclude themselves from the binding effects
of a settlement reached in a derivative action. 172 The only way share-
holders can avoid the effects of the settlement is to "terminate their
interests in the corporation."' 73 For obvious reasons, this is not an
adequate safeguard.
The second problem, also common to both derivative and class ac-
tions, results from the characteristics of collective actions. "Collective
action refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by
two or more individuals."174 Problems with collective actions arise
when free-riders partake in the settlement with the group, but sepa-
166. See id. at 22-27.
167. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implica-
tions of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and De-
rivative Actions, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 669, 677 (1986) (stating that "such actions are
uniquely vulnerable to collusive settlements that benefit plaintiffs attorneys
rather than their clients"); Macey & Miller, supra note 163, at 44-45 (recognizing
the different ways in which an attorney may benefit under the different compen-
sation schemes).
168. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) (stating that in a class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), "the court will exclude the member from the class if the mem-
ber so requests"), with FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.1 (failing to provide the shareholder in a
derivative suit the same option).
169. This feature is only available in class actions brought under FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b)(3). See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Rules
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not have an opt-out provision.").
170. Kim, supra note 161, at 117.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 118.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 133.
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rate from the group once separation becomes more beneficial than par-
ticipation. Essentially, the free-riders reap the "benefits of other
members' adherence to the collective decision while disregarding that
decision themselves."175 In the settlement context, collective action
problems will arise when individual, free-riding class members or
shareholders are free to appeal a settlement reached by the group.
The appeal by free-riders "makes settlements more costly and in-
creases the likelihood that settlements will be more difficult to final-
ize."1 7 6 Thus, when there are no restraints on the appeal of free-
riders, settlements can be significantly hampered.
B. Theoretical Solution to the Problems
When considered theoretically, as most commentators and courts
have in fact done, 17 7 the best solution to these problems, they argue, is
to allow objecting, nonparty shareholders to appeal a district court's
approval of a settlement without requiring them to intervene.1 78 Es-
sentially, they have decided that reducing the agency costs is more
important than collective action concerns. This section describes the
basis for their conclusion.179
The argument starts by recognizing the consequences of allowing
appeals by nonparty shareholders who object to a settlement. With
appeals made easier than they otherwise would be if intervention
were required, the plaintiffs' attorneys will recognize that there is a
greater chance that their settlement will be appealed. "As appeals be-
come less difficult to bring, these attorneys will be less inclined to
enter into unmeritorious settlements that can easily be upset on ap-
peal by objecting shareholders."so Thus, the attorneys will be more
likely to reach a settlement more favorable to the shareholders, which
in turn will reduce agency costs. At the same time, however, collective
action problems will be intensified. By making appeals easier to
175. Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1241, 1243
(1997).
176. Kim, supra note 161, at 134.
177. See Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 67-68; Bell Atd. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1307-10; Kim, supra note
161, at 132-34; Fazendeiro, supra note 161, at 571-90; Cecilia Lacey O'Connell,
Comment, The Role of the Objector and the Current Circuit Court Confusion Re-
garding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1: Should Non-Named Shareholders
be Permitted to Appeal Adverse Judgments?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 939, 977-984
(1999).
178. See supra note 177.
179. Although the argument is not specifically stated by the courts and other commen-
tators that subscribe to the argument, the basics of it are set forth in a brief, well-
written fashion in Kim, supra note 161, at 132-34. Accordingly, only this article
will be cited in support of their argument. However, it should be reemphasized
that the courts and commentators listed in note 177 all support the argument.
180. Kim, supra note 161, at 133 (emphasis added).
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bring, it then becomes easier for free-riding shareholders to appeal an
otherwise beneficial settlement.
If individual shareholders in derivative suits know that they can each gain the
right to appeal so long as they appear at the settlement hearing and object,
they may be tempted to do so and thus "defect" from the group settlement at a
rate much higher than would have been the case without such a rule. As a
result, the removal of barriers to appeal makes settlements more costly and
increases the likelihood that settlements will be more difficult to finalize. 1 8 1
If, on the other hand, courts required intervention before a non-
party shareholder could appeal, the opposite result would be reached.
Agency costs would increase because plaintiffs' attorneys would real-
ize that this additional burden decreases the likelihood that a non-
party shareholder will appeal the settlement, thus giving the
attorneys a greater opportunity to reach settlements that benefit
themselves more than the shareholders. The collective action
problems, however, would be reduced. "Because fewer shareholders
will be inclined to take on the burden of formally intervening in the
lawsuit, proposed settlements will be much less likely to meet with
opposition. This reduces the costs of finalizing a settlement and con-
tributes to a quick and efficient resolution of the action."1 8 2
Since both alternatives have advantages and disadvantages, the
question then becomes which alternative provides the greatest bene-
fit. The courts and commentators that support the described argu-
ment conclude that allowing objecting shareholders to appeal
produces the most desirable results. "[A]lthough there is a price for
adopting a rule that requires only objections to preserve appellate
rights in derivative suits, the corresponding benefits of reducing
agency costs, decreasing the risk of collusive arrangements, and en-
suring fair and adequate settlements make the price worth
paying."lS3
C. Practical Solution to the Problems
The argument set forth above makes sense in theory. However,
when one examines the practical realities surrounding the derivative
suit and the appeal of a settlement, a rule requiring intervention
before a nonparty shareholder may appeal a settlement avoids both
problems described above.
The justification for the objection requirement in the argument
above was that, even though it increased the likelihood of collective
action problems, it reduced agency costs. The argument that it re-
181. Id. at 133-34.
182. Id. at 134.
183. Id. Again, the Kim article is cited because it provides the best description of the
argument. The courts and the other commentators cited in note 177 have all
implicitly reached the same conclusion.
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duced agency costs was premised on the belief that a plaintiffs attor-
ney who knows that his settlement "can easily be upset on appeal by
objecting shareholders"184 will have an incentive "to create valid set-
tlements that reflect the true value of the suit."185
Similarly, the intervention requirement was criticized because it
would increase agency costs by providing an additional barrier to non-
party shareholders wishing to appeal the plaintiffs attorney's settle-
ment. Knowing that appeals are less likely, the attorney would be
more inclined to reach a settlement that benefits herself rather than
her client.
These arguments are based on one important premise: that plain-
tiffs' attorneys will tailor their behavior based on how easy it is for
nonparties to appeal. While this premise makes sense in theory, it
does not hold up in practice. In reality, even without the intervention
requirement, it is highly unlikely that a district court's approval of a
settlement will be overturned on appeal. With this fact known by the
plaintiffs attorney, it is unlikely that the addition of this relatively
slight procedural burden will have a significant effect on how the
plaintiffs attorney structures the settlement.1 8 6 Thus, whether or not
intervention is required before a nonparty shareholder may appeal
will have no effect on the attorney, since she will think it unlikely in
either case that the appellate court will overturn the district court's
approval of the settlement. Consequently, either rule will result in
the same agency costs. Since neither rule provides any greater reduc-
tion in agency costs than the other, the most beneficial rule would be
the one that reduces the collective action problems. Accordingly, re-
quiring nonparty shareholders to intervene before they may appeal is
the more desirable rule.
There are essentially two reasons why success at the appellate
level is unlikely. First, appellate courts "review the district court's ap-
proval of a [settlement reached in a] shareholder's derivative lawsuit
for abuse of discretion."187 Under the abuse of discretion standard,
"only if an appellate court is convinced that the court below was
clearly wrong will it reverse a discretionary decision."1ss
Furthermore,
discretion.., is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fancifil or unrea-
sonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. Ifreasona-
184. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. When compared with the tremendous obstacles that an appellant must overcome
to get a favorable judgment once she is allowed to appeal, the additional burden
of the intervention requirement is insignificant.
187. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1305 (3d Cir. 1993).
188. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 13.4, at 608 (2d ed. 1993).
[Vol. 79:171
FELZEN V. ANDREAS
ble men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court,
then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. 1 8 9
Thus, it appears that unless a district court's approval of a settlement
is completely unfounded, it will not be overturned on appeal.
The second reason that success on appeal is unlikely is the ten-
dency of judges to favor settlements. "In deciding whether to approve
this settlement proposal, the court starts from the familiar axiom that
a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial."190 One
commentator went so far as to state that "[a] judge faces virtually no
prospect of reversal for approving a settlement."'91 Thus, when the
tendency of judges to favor settlements is combined with the discre-
tion a reviewing court gives to the district court when it approves a
settlement, it is highly unlikely that a settlement will be overturned
on appeal.
IV. BENEFIT TO THE CORPORATION
In light of modern protection for corporate officers, the appeal of a
settlement is likely to hurt the corporation rather than help it. Thus,
a rule that reduces the number of appeals by requiring intervention
will benefit the corporation.
Two benefits may arise from the commencement of derivative ac-
tions. "First, [a] successful suit may confer monetary benefits on
shareholders: corporations may recover damages from errant manag-
ers for past harms and undo or avert corrupt transactions. Second,
suit - or, more precisely, the prospect of suit - can add to corporate
value by deterring wrongdoing."' 9 2 However, both of these benefits
have essentially been undermined by practices that ultimately result
in the corporation paying the director's or officer's liability,193 rather
than the wrongdoing director or officer paying it themselves.19 4 Since
the corporation essentially pays for the liabilities of the wrongdoing
directors and officers, it in effect pays itself and therefore receives no
189. Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
190. In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
191. Macey & Miller, supra note 163, at 46.
192. Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?,
82 GEo. L.J. 1733, 1738 (1994).
193. "Many large corporations have adopted by-laws authorizing ... indemnification
to the full extent permitted by law, and virtually every corporation listed on a
national securities exchange purchases liability insurance for its corporate offi-
cials covering... legal expenses." Coffee, supra note 167, at 677. Thus, the cor-
poration, and ultimately the shareholders, pay for the corporate official's
liabilities whether it be through indemnification or through insurance premiums.
194. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 Dicta L. REv. 355, 387-88 (1994) (recogniz-
ing that "individual defendants can settle the case with other people's money.");
Romano, supra note 89, at 62 ("the vast majority of settlements are paid by D & 0
insurance" for which the shareholders bear the cost).
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monetary benefit. At the same time, it can hardly be said that the
directors and officers are deterred when they are required to pay noth-
ing. Although the details of these practices are beyond the scope of
this note, they are worth mentioning to show how little benefit the
derivative suit derives to the shareholder, especially when nonparty
shareholders appeal. Derivative suits just cost the corporation more
money. In fact, the only parties that really benefit from derivative
litigation are the attorneys. 195
V. CONCLUSION
Although the basis for the court's decision in Felzen is subject to
criticism, its ultimate holding that nonparty shareholders are re-
quired to intervene before they can appeal the district court's approval
of a settlement produces the more beneficial result for the corporation.
In light of the fact that most corporations either indemnify or insure
their corporate officers, the derivative suit provides little benefit to the
corporation. As a result, the corporation pays for the defendants' lia-
bilities and for the attorneys' fees. Thus, when the parties to a deriva-
tive suit reach a settlement, it only harms the corporation more when
the settlements are appealed. The appeal will only result in more at-
torneys' fees, without providing any corresponding benefit to the cor-
poration. This is especially true when one considers how unlikely it is
that a settlement will actually be overturned on appeal.
All of these factors indicate that a rule reducing the number of
worthless appeals will result in the most favorable outcome for the
corporation. The rule requiring intervention before shareholders can
appeal offers more of a deterrent effect than the rule allowing ob-
jecting shareholders to appeal. In addition, the former will result in
virtually the same agency costs as the latter, while at the same time
providing greater protection from collective action problems. In sum,
the intervention rule will provide the greater protection from the
problems inherent in derivative actions and will minimize the loss to
the corporation.
195. See Romano, supra note 89, at 84 ("The principal beneficiaries of the litigation
therefore appear to be attorneys, who win fee awards in 90 percent of settled
suits").
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